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THE ELIGIBILITY PARADOX
ALFRED DENNIS MATHEWSON*
"The only reason many of them are in college 'is to play
ball' . . . There's no pressure . . . to keep [athletes] in
school, any more than any other student."'
The collegiate and sports worlds are abuzz about the recent
case Cureton v. NCAA. 2 A federal district court held that the Na-
tional Collegiate Athletic Association's ("NCAA") use of standard-
ized test scores in its initial eligibility requirements violated Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 3 Those who agreed that the NCAA's
rules slammed the door of educational opportunity in the faces of
African-American athletes have hailed the decision. Those who dis-
agreed saw the standards as necessary to prevent colleges and uni-
versities, who are more interested in their athletic prowess than
intellectual growth, from exploiting the same athletes that have crit-
icized the court's decision. The NCAA responded by empanelling a
"blue ribbon" committee that considered, but later rejected, the re-
turn of universal freshman ineligibility in lieu of a uniform mini-
mum standard.
None of the above groups would be shocked to learn that the
speaker of the opening italicized quotation above is a university
president speaking in the 1990s. They may, however, be surprised
to learn that, as regrettable as the speaker's sentiments may be, the
comment accurately represents the current state of the law. Under
existing law, a university owes no obligation to a scholarship athlete
other than an opportunity to participate in its athletic program and
* Associate Dean and Professor of Law, University of New Mexico. The au-
thor is also the Chair of the Faculty Senate Athletic Council at the University of
New Mexico. Howard University, B.B.A.; Yale University, J.D. This article is dedi-
cated to Mrs. Anne Rountree, my first grade teacher whose investment of time and
effort in my nertnni educatinnl arhievPnnPntq PyPmnifies the idnak T enrpQQ in
this article. The views expressed in this article are the author's alone and do not
represent the views or position of the University of New Mexico or the Faculty
Senate Athletic Council.
1. College President Assesses Athletes, Editorial, ALBUQUERQUEJ., Aug. 11, 1995, at
A12 (quoting J. Michael Ovenduff, former President of New Mexico State
University).
2. 37 F. Supp. 2d 687 (E.D. Pa. 1999), rev'd 198 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 1999).
3. See Cureton, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 689 (examining impact of standardized test
scores on eligibility requirements).
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to sit in a classroom. 4 The obligation to obtain value from that op-
portunity is imposed squarely on the shoulders of each individual
athlete. A former college athlete has described the university's obli-
gation in critical terms. He observed that a university provides stu-
dent-athletes, in exchange for their participation, something that
costs the university very little extra to provide: the opportunity to
take classes that will be offered regardless of whether the student-
athletes are there or not.5 His point was that student-athletes may
not value the educational opportunity very highly if universities are
unwilling to invest additional dollars in it.
Nevertheless, universities intend educational opportunities to
comprise the core of compensation paid to student-athletes, hoping
that any benefits derived from professional preparation are inciden-
tal to, or a mere by-product of, the educational opportunity.6
Whether the educational opportunity is valuable depends almost
entirely on the actions of the student-athlete off the playing field.
The athlete's ability to place value on the educational opportunity
is constrained by his or her motivation and preparation for a col-
lege education. Without a legal obligation imposed on universities
to render the educational opportunity valuable, this paradox has
led to a system of governing principles that ostensibly enhance aca-
4. See Alfred Dennis Mathewson, Intercollegiate Athletics and the Assignment of
Legal Rights, 35 ST. Louis U. L.J. 39, 3944, 49, 73-79 (1990) (discussing university's
duties to its student-athletes).
5. Based on comments made by Phil Abney to my Sports Law class in March
1995. Mr. Abney played basketball for the University of New Mexico and was one
of the participants in the infamous "Lobogate" of 1979. Mr. Abney stated the uni-
versity permits the athlete to sit in a classroom, which it will provide whether the
athlete is there or not. Consequently, he argued that the university is permitted to
compensate athletes with an educational opportunity, which costs the university
virtually nothing to provide. His conclusion is generally correct but does not take
into account the opportunity cost the university incurs if the athlete takes up a seat
which the university would sell to someone else, nor does it take into account the
cost of special academic advisory services. His conclusion is limited to the provi-
sion of the educational opportunity and does not apply to the provision of training
and development of athletic skills for professional sports. Nevertheless, Mr. Ab-
ney's recognition of the provision of a benefit at a limited cost to the university is
not novel. See I.R.C. § 132(b) (1)-(2) (1999) (allowing employees to exclude from
gross income value of fringe benefits which are "offered for sale to customers in
the ordinary course of the line of business of the employer" and where "the em-
ployer incurs no substantial additional cost (including foregone revenue) in pro-
viding such service to the employee.").
6. See Taylor v. Wake Forest Univ., 191 S.E.2d 379, 382 (1972) (noting that
contract law governs relationship between student-athletes and their universities).
Contrary to the popular view, the athletic scholarship is not the major source of
compensation for scholarship athletes. It certainly is not the source of compensa-
tion for walk-ons. Student-athletes provide their services as athletes primarily in
exchange for an educational opportunity and professional preparation.
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demic value, though actually result in the systemic suppression of
the value - actual and perceived - given to student-athletes in ex-
change for their participation in intercollegiate athletics.
7
This Article offers proof of this conclusion and proposes a solu-
tion. Part I begins the proof with a challenge to the prevailing or-
thodoxy that educational primacy is the central governing principle
of the NCAA. Instead it argues that the NCAA, as a voluntary gov-
erning association, is an organization whose primary mission and
function is the regulation of athletics. Athletics primacy is, thus,
the central governing principle. Accordingly, all of its rules and
bylaws, including those affecting academics, should be viewed as
promoting the sports activities. It is the promotion of academic val-
ues by an institution driven primarily by athletics values that creates
the paradox.
Part II argues that the major structural catalyst for the suppres-
sion of value is the concept of student eligibility created by the
NCAA, as an athletics governing organization. NCAA Bylaws devote
nearly fifty pages to the eligibility of student-athletes for participa-
tion in intercollegiate athletics. 8 While eligibility rules are not in-
herently flawed, the existing rules utilize a de minimis concept,
which provides universities with substantial incentives to maintain,
and discourages them from investing in or exceeding, the mini-
mum eligibility requirements. Consequently, the contemporary eli-
gibility framework serves to enhance the value of the entertainment
produced by its members but suppresses the perceived and actual
value of the educational opportunity offered by its members to stu-
dent-athletes in exchange for their athletic skill. 9
Some commentators have called for doctrinal solutions to this
systemic suppression of value, such as judicial application of the im-
7. See Mathewson, supra note 4, at 86 (suggesting code of intercollegiate ath-
letics or arbitration systems as means to value education and athletics); see also
Timothy Davis, Intercollegiate Athletics: Competing Models and Conflicting Realities, 25
. J. 269, 237'(5 Q 94) ((100A ig value s under!, t, r/,-tt-nn
model of value as "anachronistic"). The suppression of the value of the educa-
tional opportunity has the effect of increasing the perceived value of the profes-
sional opportunity, which for most athletes is equivalent to a lottery ticket that for
most is a losing one.
8. See Kevin E. Broyles, NCAA Regulation of Intercollegiate Athletics: Time for a New
Game Plan, 46 ALA. L. REv. 487, 530-33 (1995) (discussing eligibility requirements
of NCAA).
9. See Davis, supra note 7, at 270-71 (outlining relationship among amateur
college athletics, education and commercialism). In professional sports, eligibility
questions are rare. Theoretically, nearly everyone is eligible. The big fights are
over the value to be returned to athletes.
2000]
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plied duty of good faith in contract law. 10 A perennial chorus sings
loudly for the abandonment of amateurism and for the payment of
athletes in revenue producing sports.11 Others with more moder-
ate voices have called for varying degrees of systemic reform. 12
Apart from the chorus, few have urged a serious examination of the
fundamental concept of eligibility.
Part III argues that the solution lies not in further changes in
the legal regime but rather in the reform of the eligibility frame-
work. It argues that the NCAA should develop a framework that
separates the concept of athletic eligibility from academic achieve-
ment. It urges the NCAA to adopt a narrow concept of athletic
eligibility and use academic standards to increase the educational
value rendered to student-athletes. This argument may startle
some, but as will be demonstrated, it is the most plausible way to
assure that colleges and universities honor their bargains with stu-
dent-athletes and provide them with real value in exchange for
their athletic participation.
10. See Timothy Davis, An Absence of Good Faith: Defining a University's Educa-
tional Obligation to Student-Athletes, 28 Hous. L. REv. 743, 74748 (1991) (discussing
application of contract law to college/university and student-athlete relationship).
11. See William Gerberding, Historical Perspective of Amateurism, 22 J.C. & U.L.
11, 18-19 (1995) (forecasting end of amateur college athletics in near future); C.
Peter Goplerud III, Stipends for Collegiate Athletes: A Philosophical Spin on a Controver-
sial Proposal, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 125, 126-127 (1996) (suggesting stipends be
made available to student-athletes in college); Matthew J. Mitten, University Price
Competition for Elite Students and Athletes: Illusions and Realities, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 59,
83 (1995) (stating, "[U] niversity recruiting for... athletes is a commercial activity
that should be subject to traditional antitrust analysis."); Kenneth L. Shropshire,
Legislation for the Glory of Sport: Amateurism and Compensation, 1 SETON HALLJ. SPORT
L. 7, 27 (1991) (stating, "[C]ollege athletes require more money than allowed
under the existing rules."); Vladimir P. Belo, Note, The Shirts Off Their Backs: Col-
leges Getting Away with Violating the Right of Publicity, 19 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J.
133, 154 (1996) (arguing student-athletes deserve "some share of the monies gen-
erated by their own unique personas and talent."); Leonard M. Shulman, Com-
ment, Compensation for Collegiate Athletes: A Run for More Than the Roses, 22 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 701, 702 (1985) (asserting that college athletes should receive finan-
cial compensation above traditional scholarships and financial aid).
12. See e.g., Broyles, supra note 8, at 530-33 (discussing eligibility requirements
of NCAA); Robert N. Davis, Athletic Reform: Missing the Bases in University Athletics, 20
CAP. U. L. REv. 597, 600-08 (1991) (criticizing NCAA's lack of reforms regarding
relationship among academics, commercialism and athlete-institution); Rodney K.
Smith, Little Ado About Something: Playing Games With the Reform of Big-Time Intercolle-
giate Athletics, 20 CAP. U. L. REv. 567, 584-85 (1991) (arguing only hope for true
reform lies in accreditation, academic impact statement and general plans); Ray
Yasser, A Comprehensive Blueprint for the Reform of Intercollegiate Athletics, 3 MARQ.
SPORTS L.J. 123, 123 (1993) (stating his goal is "a blueprint for restructuring, not a
call for demolition.").
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I. THE PRINCIPLE OF ATHLETICS PRIMACY
Much of the law that has developed regarding the internal af-
fairs of the NCAA and the rights and obligations of student-athletes
is premised upon the NCAA's status as an educational organiza-
tion.1 3 This educational character is derived from its membership,
namely more than 1100 institutions of higher education.' 4 The
NCAA has frequently taken the position in litigation that its rules
and regulations are entitled to deference because of its educational
nexus. For example, in Hennessey v. NCAA, 15 a case brought by a
coach challenging NCAA rules, the NCAA unsuccessfully asserted
the defense that as an educational organization it was entitled to an
exemption from the antitrust laws.16
Numerous judicial opinions reflect the influence of the educa-
tional character of the NCAA's activities. For example, in Banks v.
NCAA,17 a case in which a student-athlete challenged the loss of
amateur status, a majority of the court was strongly influenced by
the educational nexus in upholding the NCAA's "No Agent" and
"No Draft" rules. 18 The cases that have been influenced by the edu-
cational nexus have not been limited to antitrust cases. For exam-
ple, in Walters v. Fullwood,'9 the New York Court of Appeals held
13. SeeJOHN C. WEISTART & CYM H. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS 1-8 (1979)
(outlining regulation of amateur athletics and describing educational organiza-
tions' (such as NCAA) roles).
14. See NCAA v. Roberts, No. TCA 94-40413-WS, 1994 WL 750585, at *1 (N.D.
Fla. Nov. 8, 1994) (describing NCAA as, "a voluntary association of approximately
1100 members including colleges, universities, and affiliated conferences and or-
ganizations located in each of the fifty states.").
15. 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977).
16. See id. at 1154 (holding for NCAA on merits). But see Law v. NCAA, 134
F.3d 1010, 1024 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding against NCAA under similar facts).
17. 977 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1992).
18. See id. at 1090 (upholding NCAA's "No-Draft" rule in football to prevent
"profit making objectives... [from] overshadow[ing] educational objectives"). See
NCAA, 199 6-. NAA_ MA_,u..TT rhereinnfter NC.AA MANT TAT] 1 19 . 1 (1QQ ( -
serting "No-Agent" rule, which disqualifies student who enters into contract with
sports agent for marketing of his or her athletic skill); NCAA MANUAL § 12.2.4.2
(asserting "No-Draft" rule that disqualifies student-athlete if he or she asks to be
placed on draft list of professional sports league); see also NCAA MANUAL § 12.2.4.
2.1 (providing limited exception for professional basketball). Student-athletes
who play baseball are not subject to the rule because Major League Baseball does
not require them to take any action to be eligible for the draft. See Amateur Draft
History, at http://www.majorleaguebaseball.com/u/baseball/mlbcom/history/
miscdraft.htm (last visited May 22, 2000) (stating history of and procedure for
baseball draft of amateurs).
19. 675 F. Supp. 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
20001
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that a contract between a student-athlete and a sports agent which
violated NCAA rules was unenforceable on public policy grounds. 20
Scholars have long recognized the educational character of the
NCAA. Indeed, a large amount of recent scholarship has addressed
the educational nature of the NCAA. 21 Yet, the NCAA and its mem-
bers often have been exposed to strident criticism for proclaiming
their educational roots while failing to recognize the significance of
their role as economic actors engaged in the production and sale of
athletic competition, especially in football and basketball. Profes-
sor Weistart was one of the first scholars to write of the tension be-
tween academic and economic, or as he termed it, "entrepreneurial
functions."22 Weistart stated:
The NCAA fulfills at least two important functions in inter-
collegiate sports. It serves as a monitor of the academic
integrity of its members' programs, a role which requires
that it give particular attention to preserving the amateur
character of the underlying activity. The NCAA also oper-
ates as an economic regulator and promoter. It seeks to
foster sports competition among member schools and to
increase the attention given the events by the general
public.23
He argued that external regulators, such as the judiciary, should
subject NCAA regulations to careful scrutiny to ascertain which
function the regulation serves and apply rules accordingly. 24
Professor Timothy Davis has found a similar dichotomy in con-
ceptions of the nature of intercollegiate athletics in judicial opin-
ions. He has argued that a careful review of judicial opinions
reveals two competing models of intercollegiate athletics: 25 (1) an
amateur/education paradigm, typified by cases such as Banks, and
20. See id. at 160 (declaring agency contract with student-athlete unenforce-
able on public policy grounds).
21. SeeJohn R. Allison, Rule-Making Accuracy in the NCAA and its Member Institu-
tions: Do Their Decisional Structures and Processes Promote Educational Primacy for the
Student Athlete?, 44 U. KAN. L. REv. 1 (1995) (discussing NCAA tendencies to pro-
mote educational primacy). See generally Sports Law Symposium, 67 DENV. U. L. REv.
111 (1990); Symposium, The NCAA and the Student-Athlete, 1995 Wis. L. REv. 545
(1995); Symposium on the Reform of Big-Time Intercollegiate Athletics, 20 CAP. U. L. REv.
543 (1991).
22. John C. Weistart, Legal Accountability and the NCAA, 10J.C. & U.L. 167, 177
(1983-84) (noting goal of NCAA as promoting amateur sports).
23. Id. at 173.
24. See id. at 177-80 (discussing suggested scrutiny level of NCAA regulations).
25. See Davis, supra note 7, at 273-82 (discussing competing models of inter-
collegiate athletics).
[Vol. 7: p. 83
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(2) a commercial/educational paradigm exemplified by cases such
as NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma.26 These
bipolar models mirror Weistart's distinct functions of the NCAA;
but where Weistart saw tension between functions, Davis saw the
dominance of one. Davis argued that the amateur/education
model has been the dominant model in intercollegiate athleticsju-
rispradence. 27 He showed that the amateur/education model most
frequently results in an irrebuttable presumption that intercollegi-
ate athletics and the NCAA are primarily academic. 28 He would
reverse the presumption and adopt the commercial/education
model in light of existing realities. 29 The commercial/education
model, however, would lead to a characterization of the NCAA as a
primarily commercial organization.
Professor John Allison has also examined the character of the
NCAA.30 Allison worried that commercial and athletic purposes
overshadowed educational concerns. In light of competing ten-
sions, he sought to determine the viability of the educational mis-
sion by intercollegiate athletes. Rather than analyze the general
character of the NCAA, he evaluated the "decisional structures and
processes of the NCAA and its member institutions" in promoting
the goal of educational primacy.31 Specifically, he examined what
he termed, "one of the NCAA's most fundamental articulated prin-
ciples: while a student-athlete matriculates at a college or university,
his or her status as a student should take precedence over his or her
status as an athlete."3 2 He doubted whether the structures ex-
amined promoted educational primacy. 33
The fundamental principle, as he defined it, is narrower than
academic or educational functions and purposes contemplated by
Professors Weistart and Davis. And, it is narrower than the educa-
26. 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (analyzing commercial benefit of amateur athletics).
27. See Davis, supra note 7, at 270 (stating, although two models exist, ama-
teur/education model is more prominent).
28. See id. at 271, 278 (stating amateur/education model is based upon
"anachronistic" values).
29. See id. at 326 (noting commercial/education model, though imperfect, is
good "starting point for constructive debate").
30. See Allison, supra note 21, at 15-45 (discussing relationship between NCAA
structures and policies in relation to its goals).
31. Id. at 15 (discussing application of NCAA goal of education).
32. Id. at 5-6 (defining "educational primacy").
33. See id. at 56 (stating, "[A] study of the decisional structures of the NCAA
and many of its member institutions reveals several characteristics causing one to
question whether they tend toward decision making that accurately promotes edu-
cational primacy.").
2000]
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tional mission articulated in Article 1.3.1 of the NCAA Constitution,
which provides:
BASIC PURPOSE. The competitive athletics programs of
member institutions are designed to be a vital part of the
educational system. A basic purpose of this Association is
to maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of
the educational program and the athlete as an integral
part of the student body and, by so doing, retain a clear
line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and
professional sports.34
The references to educational systems and programs recognize the
fundamental mission of member institutions is education and that
athletics are merely one component of that mission. Professor Al-
lison's fundamental principle is alluded to in the NCAA's purpose
clause in the "integral part of the student body" language, but it is
not clearly stated.35
His fundamental principle of educational primacy, perhaps,
may be gleaned from Article 2.2 of the NCAA Constitution on "The
Principle of Student-Athlete Welfare."36 Article 2.2.1 provides:
OVERALL EDUCATIONAL EXPERIENCE. It is the responsibility
of each member institution to establish and maintain an
environment in which a student-athlete's activities are con-
ducted as an integral part of the student-athlete's educa-
tional experience.37
Allison's articulation of the fundamental principle appears to be a
statement of a common conceptualization of intercollegiate athlet-
ics rather than an express statement of NCAA policy or constitu-
tional principles. This formulation is reflected in the works of
other scholars. Professor Robert Davis criticized the 1991 "reform
convention" for not doing enough to strengthen academic require-
ments for student-athletes.38 Professor Ray Yasser also argued for
34. NCAA MANuAL, supra note 18, § 1.3.1.
35. See id. (outlining fundamental purpose and policy of NCAA). Note the
absence of the preference placed on scholastic involvement over athletics in
NCAA's purpose while Professor Allison asserts priority of scholastics.
36. See id. § 2.2 (articulating NCAA principle of student-athlete welfare).
37. Id. § 2.2.1.
38. See Davis, supra note 12, at 605 (relating that "Reform Convention" is
.misnomer").
[Vol. 7: p. 83
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substantial changes in the standards applied for admission of stu-
dent-athletes. 39
I do not disagree with Professor Allison's articulation of the
fundamental principle or its recognition by the NCAA. The point
is that the principle leads to analyses of the NCAA with a character
that it does not have - a mistake Allison did not make. Signifi-
cantly, he assessed the extent to which the NCAA and member insti-
tutions abide by the principle. 40 He demonstrated that it is the
members of the NCAA who are governed by educational primacy.4 1
In doing so, his analysis failed to recognize that the ability of the
NCAA to implement a principle of educational primacy is limited
by its essential character, which is not that of an educational organi-
zation. The NCAA, as a voluntary association, exists as an organiza-
tion that is separate and distinct from its individual members. This
separate existence not only has been acknowledged by the United
States Supreme Court but has also formed the basis for its decision
in NCAA v. Tarkanian.42 Lower federal courts also have been influ-
enced by these separate legal personas. 43 Separate existence in-
cludes a separate and distinct purpose from its member institutions
whose missions are driven by educational primacy. Universities, as
educational institutions, are required to place student status over
athlete status because it is their mission to do so, not because of
NCAA rules.
The commercial versus educational classification distracts from
a more accurate dichotomy. The NCAA is an organization gov-
erned by the principle of athletics primacy. The NCAA does not
exist to advance the learning of mathematics, physics, history, litera-
ture, English or music. Nor does it exist to foster research to ad-
vance the cause of science, or to publish scholarly papers on
Fermat's Last Theorem. Nor does it have as a major goal the train-
ing of school teachers. It does not even exist to further teaching
39. See Yasser, supra note 12, at 135-36 (criticizing "special admit" policy for
athletes in college admissions).
40. See Allison, supra note 21, at 15-16 (discussing extent to which NCAA
members abide by its stated principles).
41. See id. at 15 (reasserting NCAA's primary goal of education).
42. 488 U.S. 179, 191-98 (1988) (holding that NCAA was not "state actor"
when it investigated and suspended UNLV head basketball coach, Jerry
Tarkanian).
43. See Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. NCAA, 560 F.2d 352, 355 (8th Cir.
1977) (noting separation between NCAA and members); see also California State
Univ., Hayward v. NCAA, 47 Cal. App. 3d 533, 543-44 (1975) (holding that district
court did not abuse its discretion when it enjoined NCAA from enforcing rule
until trial on merits of constitutionality of rule).
2000]
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and research in physical education or sports administration and
management. Its members do. Its members must be educational
institutions whose missions necessarily are driven by educational
primacy.
The NCAA is, and should be seen and accepted as, an athletic
organization whose principal function is to regulate athletic compe-
titions involving athletes who are students at its member universi-
ties. 44 This view is clearly articulated in the purposes of the NCAA
set forth in Article 1 of its constitution. The purpose articles begin
and end with the NCAA's regulation of intercollegiate athletics
competition. Article 1.2(a) provides that the NCAA is, "To initiate,
stimulate and improve intercollegiate athletics programs for stu-
dent-athletes . . . . -45 Similarly, Article 1.2(i) provides that the
NCAA exists "[t]o study in general all phases of competitive inter-
collegiate athletics and establish standards whereby the colleges
and universities of the United States can maintain their athletics
programs on a high level." 46 Nine purposes are set forth in Article
1.2.4 7 Each purpose explicitly pertains to athletics.
48
An invaluable contribution by Professor Allison was his focus
on NCAA member institutions as repositories of educational pri-
macy. His analysis also found them lacking in that they did not live
up to educational primacy in the operation of their athletic pro-
grams. 49 My analysis diverges from his to the extent that he views
the NCAA as bearing an educational burden equal to that of mem-
ber institutions. In my view, member institutions alone are gov-
erned by educational primacy, but any interest the NCAA has in
educational concerns is necessarily subordinate to the principle of
athletics primacy.
This Article will demonstrate the adverse effect of athletic pri-
macy on the academic standards adopted by the NCAA. However
well intentioned, the principal interest of the NCAA in academic
44. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 18, § 1.2 (1995) (articulating purposes of
NCAA). Article 1 states, "The purposes of this Association are: (a) to initiate, stim-
ulate and improve intercollegiate athletics programs ... and to promote and de-
velop educational leadership, physical fitness, athletics excellence and athletics
participation as a recreational pursuit; . . . (i) [t]o study in general all phases of
competitive intercollegiate athletics and establish standards whereby the colleges
and universities . . . can maintain their athletics programs on a high level." Id.
45. Id. § 1.2(a).
46. Id. § 1.2(i).
47. See id. § 1.2 (listing nine general purposes of NCAA).
48. See id. (articulating that purpose of NCAA involves athletics).
49. See Allison, supra note 21, at 55-59 (discussing educational primacy in ath-
letic procedures).
[Vol. 7: p. 83
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regulations is not the academic achievement of student-athletes,
but its athletics regulatory purpose. This point was implicit in the
Supreme Court's opinion in NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University
of Oklahoma.50 Consider the case of NCAA limitations on the num-
ber of scholarships member universities may offer in each sport.
Such limits arise out of athletic concerns rather than educational
ones. If Oooh University offers only 100 athletic scholarships to
comply with NCAA scholarship limits when it can afford to offer
1000 athletic scholarships, the rules of the governing association
have the effect of reducing the number of students obtaining schol-
arships. If NCAA imposed no scholarship limits, Oooh University
would offer 1000 scholarships and reduce the number of athletes
available for other institutions. NCAA limits on scholarships flow
from its interest in the distribution of athletic talent and controlling
the costs of operating athletic programs. 51 The rule promotes ath-
letic policy while suppressing academic concerns.
One of the more prominent examples of academic rules dic-
tated by athletics primacy is the NCAA's influence in the establish-
ment of minimum standards for high school college-preparatory
curricula - at least for athletes - in the United States. In Jones v.
Wichita State University,5 2 the NCAA asserted that it should not be in
the business of establishing high school curricula, but it abandoned
this position in the face of widespread criticism of the exploitation
of student-athletes by member institutions. Beginning with the pas-
sage of the infamous Proposition 48 and its controversial progeny
now codified in Bylaw 14.3.1.1, the NCAA, acting to further the in-
tegrity of intercollegiate athletics competition, has attempted to in-
fluence substantially the core courses which high schools must offer
to college bound students. The shaping of academic standards with
policies rooted in athletics primacy has led to the infringement of
the legitimate educational functions of high schools and unfairly
excludes athletes who have vigorously pursued academic achieve-
50. 468 U.S. 85, 101-02 (1984) (stating. "[the NCAA seeks to market a partic-
ular brand of football - college football. The identification of this 'product' with
an academic tradition differentiates college football from and makes it more popu-
lar than professional sports to which it might otherwise be comparable.., in order
to preserve the character and quality of the 'product,' athletes must not be paid,
must be required to attend class, and the like.").
51. See Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group
Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARv. L. REv. 1003, 1029-33 (1995)
(explaining how rational economic actors engaged in nonproductive arms races to
"keep up with the Joneses").
52. 698 F.2d 1082, 1087 (10th Cir. 1983) (upholding trial court's denial of
preliminary injunction prohibiting NCAA from declaring athlete ineligible).
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ment. For example, Bylaw 14.3.1.1 established core course require-
ments, with the NCAA as the arbiter of which courses qualify as
core courses. The implementation of the rule has resulted in one
major controversy after another. For example, the Governor of
Minnesota publicly criticized the NCAA when it determined that an
honors English course could not qualify as a core course and ad-
versely affected the athletic eligibility of 160 Minnesota students.5 3
The NCAA's position was encouraged, if not sanctioned, by the
courts in NCAA v. Tarkanian in which the Supreme Court held that
the NCAA was not a state actor and therefore not limited by consti-
tutional constraints. 54 That decision was buttressed by subsequent
cases such as NCAA v. Miller,55 in which the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the enactment of a statute
by Nevada regulating the NCAA's enforcement process was uncon-
stitutional. 56 Although the Ninth Circuit reached the correct result
on the particular statute, it apparently was blinded to the conun-
drum it left. Under Miller, the NCAA is free to coerce school dis-
tricts in establishing high school curricula for children required by
state law to attend school, but states are constitutionally prohibited
from regulating the NCAA enforcement of rules affecting those
same students.
Similar results were reached by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit in NCAA v. Smith 57 and Cureton v.
NCAA5 8 involving, respectively, the applicability of Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972 and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. Member institutions are subject to both statutes and
NCAA rules. These cases asked whether the statutes should apply
to the NCAA when collective compliance by members with NCAA
rules results in a violation. The courts in both cases analyzed the
NCAA as an organization separate and distinct from its members. 59
53. See Doug Bedell, For NCAA, Rules Are Easier to Make Than Enforce, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Jan. 3, 1998, at 9B (using Minnesota as example of confusing
NCAA eligibility standards).
54. 488 U.S. 179, 191-98 (1988) (ruling on suspension of UNLV head basket-
ball coach Jerry Tarkanian).
55. 10 F.3d 633 (9th Cir. 1993).
56. See id. at 635, 640 (finding for NCAA); see generally NCAA v. Roberts, No.
TCA 94-40413-WS, 1994 WL 750585 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 8, 1994) (reaching same result
with similar Florida statute).
57. 525 U.S. 459, 465, 470 (1999) (stating Third Circuit held NCAA subject to
Title IX, but vacating and remanding that judgment).
58. 37 F. Supp. 2d 687, 692-96 (E.D. Pa. 1999), rev'd 198 F.3d 107 (3d Cir.
1999) (holding NCAA is not subject to Title VI).
59. See Smith, 525 U.S. at 462-63 (stating NCAA is institution separate from its
member universities); Cureton, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 690 (same).
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The adverse impact of athletically driven initial eligibility rules
has been challenged by student-athletes in litigation over determi-
nations by the NCAA's Initial Eligibility Clearinghouse that resulted
in universities declaring otherwise eligible students ineligible from
participation in NCAA competition. In Phillip v. Fairfield Univer-
sity,6° a student-athlete accepted a full athletic scholarship but was
declared ineligible when the Initial Eligibility Clearinghouse deter-
mined that he was entitled to .33 credit hours for math courses in-
stead of the .5 established by his high school principal and state and
city boards of education. 61 The trial court granted a preliminary
injunction permitting the student-athlete to receive financial aid
and to play basketball. 62 A similar result was reached in a case in-
volving a University of New Mexico basketball player, Kenny
Thomas.63 In that case, a University of New Mexico student was
declared ineligible to participate in his freshman year on the bas-
ketball team because the Clearinghouse determined that a science
course he took in the first semester of his freshman year of high
school did not count as a core course. 64 The NCAA has recently
reverted to its original formal position that each high school will
determine whether a course is a core course. 65 In a related devel-
opment, perhaps with more significant consequences, the NCAA
settled a lawsuit brought by the Justice Department alleging that
initial eligibility rules violated the Americans with Disabilities Act. 66
60. 118 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 1997).
61. See id. at 135 (allowing injunction to stand but remanding for correct ap-
plication of Connecticut law on duty of good faith in contract law).
62. See Phillip v. NCAA, 960 F. Supp. 552, 557-58 (D. Conn. 1997) (granting
injunction for plaintiff based on equity principles).
63. See Chris Tomasson, NCAA Oks Settlement for Thomas, ALBUQUERQUE J., May
24, 1997, at Al (noting Albuquerque judge granted preliminary injunction on No-
vember 3, 1995, allowing Kenny Thomas to play basketball as college freshman).
Nineteen months later, Thomas' suit against NCAA and the University of New
Mexico settled. Id.
64. See id. (noting Tho1_mas' agreement to sit out fa"f Seeter of his Senior
year pursuant to settlement); see also John A. Reding & Peter C. Meier, Athletes Cry
'Foul!' Over NCAA Rules: Lawsuits Challenging the Implementation of High School 'Core
Course' Eligibility Rules Shatter Association's Image of Invincibility, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 17,
1997, at B7 (discussing Darren Phillip's settlement as similar to Thomas'
settlement).
65. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 18, § 14.3.1.3 (outlining criteria for "core-
curriculum requirements").
66. See Naftali Bendavid & Bob Sakamoto, Enabling Legislation for Learning-Dis-
abled Students, CHI. TRm., May 27, 1998, at NI (noting NCAA considered classes
taken by learning-disabled students as "remedial" and insufficient for college ath-
letics eligibility).
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Pursuant to the settlement, the NCAA agreed to count classes for
learning disabled students as core courses.67
In Cureton v. NCAA, the court held that the NCAA's initial eligi-
bility standards violated the antidiscrimination provisions of Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.68 The plaintiffs were African-
American athletes who were "A" students in high school, but who
did not attain the minimum SAT or ACT score. 69 The students
were denied athletic scholarships, although otherwise eligible for
admission.70 That is, institutions driven by educational primacy
were willing to admit the plaintiffs as students but those students
could not under the rules of the NCAA receive financial aid or par-
ticipate in the intercollegiate athletic programs of Division I
institutions.71
Athletics primacy was also demonstrated in NCAA v. Smith,72
where NCAA rules on participation in athletics by graduate stu-
dents were at issue. NCAA rules prescribe four years of participa-
tion for individuals over a five-year period. The five-year period is
tied to the normal period in which students are expected to com-
plete an undergraduate degree. The rules contemplate that some
students may complete their undergraduate education in less time,
in which case they may participate as a graduate student. Again,
however, the rules contemplate that participation as a graduate stu-
dent will be at the same institution as where participation in the
athletic program as an undergraduate occurred and the undergrad-
uate degree was obtained. These rules are driven purely by athletic
concerns and are inconsistent with the educational path of a signifi-
cant number of students. Many, if not most, students, who pursue
graduate programs, matriculate at institutions other than their un-
dergraduate alma mater. In Smith, the student followed the tradi-
tional graduate pattern and enrolled in a different institution for
her graduate degree. She sought a waiver from the rule denying
67. See id. (adding NCAA will place "learning-disability experts" on eligibility
committees and will take into consideration students' learning-disabilities when
formulating decisions about eligibility); see also Mark Asher, NCAA to Lower Test
Scores and Help Learning Disabled, AUSTIN AM. STATESMAN, May 27, 1998, at C1 (dis-
cussing that Cedric Dempsey, NCAA President, has also announced that he will
recommend lowering of minimum standardized test scores now required to re-
ceive athletic scholarship, practice or play as freshman).
68. 37 F. Supp. 2d 687, 696 (E.D. Pa. 1999), rev'd 198 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 1999)
(holding NCAA is subject to Title VI).
69. See id. at 689 (describing plaintiffs in action).
70. See id. at 690-91 (explaining that students could attend college or univer-
sity at their own expense but could not participate in athletic program).
71. See id. (stressing disparity between NCAA and its member institutions).
72. 525 U.S. 459, 463-64 (1999) (outlining facts of case).
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her eligibility as provided under NCAA rules. When the NCAA re-
fused to grant the waiver, she challenged the rule on Title IX
grounds.
There can be little doubt that academic eligibility rules ema-
nating from an organization driven by athletics primacy leads to
anomalies. Individual member institutions driven by educational
primacy are the best determiners of academic eligibility for student-
athletes on their campuses. It is not disputable that "home rule"
policies led to the exploitation of student-athletes in the past. 73 It is
also true that those policies failed because the law imposes no bind-
ing obligation on universities to provide educational value to stu-
dent-athletes.7 4 It remains true, however, that one university has no
greater interest in the academic qualifications of student-athletes at
another institution than it has for students who are not athletes.
Collective action at the governing association level affecting only
student-athletes is necessarily driven by athletic, not educational
motives.
II. THE FUNCTION OF ATHLETIC ELIGIBILITY
A. Eligibility in General
Nowhere does the principle of athletics primacy conflict with
the delivery of an educational opportunity as strongly as it does over
the concept of athletic eligibility. The concept is unknown on the
playground and is of limited utility in professional sports. It neces-
sarily thrives in athletic competition associated with educational in-
stitutions. The core question, indeed the essence of athletic
eligibility, is whether a person may participate in the playing arena.
It is not synonymous to, nor should it be confused with, academic
admissibility. Eligibility involves a standard of qualification and a
command. The eligibility standard sets the characteristics that an
athlete must possess in order to qualify to participate. 75 The com-
mand applies to the institutions that field teams. They are ordered
to use only those athletes on their teams engaged in interscholastic
competition, who have the requisite qualifying characteristics.
73. See Kenneth L. Shropshire, Colorblind Propositions: Race, the SAT, & the
NCAA, 8 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 141, 143 (1997) (noting racism as one effect of
policies). For a discussion of how the NCAA's maintained the "home rule" policy
for initial eligibility until 1965, see infra notes 99-118 and accompanying text.
74. See Mathewson, supra note 4, at 53-73 (asserting failure of policies due to
failure to impose legal obligations).
75. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICrIONARY 404 (10th ed. 1995) (defining
word "eligible").
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The eligibility standard in NCAA-sponsored intercollegiate ath-
letics rests on two bedrock characteristics expressed by Justice Ste-
vens in NCAA v. Board of Regents of Oklahoma: the athletes must be
amateurs and students. 76 The dual requirement is explicitly pre-
scribed in NCAA bylaws with one additional word: "Only an ama-
teur student-athlete is eligible for intercollegiate athletics
participation in a particular sport. '77 Although the existence of an
athlete is normally presumed, the use of the terms "athlete" and
"athletics" in the fundamental eligibility standard shows its function
is clearly related to athletics primacy.
The eligibility command to member institutions is set forth in
NCAA Bylaw 14.01.1, which provides, "An institution shall not per-
mit a student-athlete to represent it in intercollegiate athletics com-
petition unless the student-athlete meets all applicable eligibility
requirements."7 8 Translated into the bedrock principles, a univer-
sity may not use an athlete in intercollegiate athletic competition
unless the athlete is a student and an amateur, as defined under
NCAA rules. The command contemplates more than a prohibition
on passive university subjects. It imposes an affirmative obligation
on universities to police athletic eligibility. A university that uses an
ineligible student-athlete is subject to forfeiture of all competitions
in which that athlete participates. 79 Moreover, the failure of a uni-
versity to treat the obligation to police as significant, even though it
does not knowingly use ineligible players, could subject it to severe
penalties.8 0 All eligibility rules, whether standards or commands, in
Articles 12 through 14 of the NCAA Bylaws, relate exclusively to
these two characteristics.
B. The Amateurism Standard
Article 12 of the NCAA Bylaws is devoted to the amateurism
characteristic. It specifies the amateur eligibility standard.81 The
standard contains two broad principles, one subjective, the other ob-
jective. The subjective standard defines an amateur student-athlete
76. 468 U.S. 85, 101-02 (1984) (analyzing structure and tradition of college
football).
77. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 18, § 12.01.1.
78. Id. § 14.01.1.
79. See id. § 19.6.1(b) (discussing forfeiture as one among many penalties for
rule violations).
80. See id. § 19.01.5 (discussing scope and nature of NCAA penalties).
81. See id. § 12.01.1 (stating only amateurs are permitted to participate in in-
tercollegiate athletics); see also id. § 14.01.3.1 (repeating basic amateur eligibility
standard).
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as "one who engages in a particular sport for the educational, physi-
cal, mental and social benefits derived therefrom and for whom
participation in that sport is an avocation."8 2 The objective princi-
ple articulated in numerous provisions focuses on whether a stu-
dent-athlete has received or receives compensation in exchange for
athletic skill. The principle may be distilled from those provisions.
An amateur student-athlete is one who does not receive, and has
never received, any compensation in exchange for athletic skill ex-
cept as authorized by NCAA rules. 83
Under the NCAA's "Principle of Rules Compliance," each
member institution is required to operate its intercollegiate athlet-
ics program in compliance with all NCAA rules and regulations. 84
The effect of this principle is the amateurism command to member
universities. A member university may not directly or indirectly pay,
apart from permitted financial aid, a student-athlete for his or her
participation in athletics. The amateur eligibility standard directly
and intentionally suppresses the value that universities pay student-
athletes in exchange for their participation. This suppression is not
limited to what the university may pay. Student-athletes may not
accept, or have ever accepted, compensation from the university or
any other source for their athletic skill.85 Once an athlete accepts
any amount of remuneration that has not been authorized, no mat-
ter how small, he or she is permanently ineligible for further inter-
collegiate participation. 8
6
There are three justifications for this amateur standard. First,
universities are engaged in the business of education, and the oper-
82. See NCAA MANuAL, supra note 18, § 12.02.1 (defining "amateur student-
athlete").
83. See Amateur Sports Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-606, 92 Stat. 3045 (1978)
(adopting definition of "amateur" as athlete who is not compensated for skill).
Amateur is one who does not play and has not played for pay except as authorized
by the rules of the appropriate sports governing body. See NCAA MANUAL, supra
note 18, § 12.01.4 (stating that scholarships are not considered pay under NCAA
rules).
84. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 18, § 2.7.1 (noting responsibility of each
institution to monitor compliance requirements); see also NICAA IVANuAL, supra
note 18, § 12.4 (allowing certain types of employment for student-athletes).
85. See id. § 12.4.2 (discussing specific athletically related employment activi-
ties). The NCAA is currently discussing changes to its amateurism rules relating to
payments for athletic skill received by an athlete before college. Kenneth L.
Shropshire, The Erosion of the NCAA Amateurism Model, 14 ANTITRUST 46 (Spring
2000) (outlining recent changes to NCAA rules and regulations).
86. See id. § 16.01.1 (outlining possible effects of student-athlete's acceptance
of unauthorized compensation). But see id. § 14.12.1 (discussing restoration of eli-
gibility and how athlete's eligibility may be restored if university successfully ap-
peals to NCAA); id. § 14.12.2 (asserting that athlete does not have right to appeal
on his or her own).
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ation of their athletic programs should be subordinated to educa-
tional primacy. Accordingly, athletic programs are either a part of
their educational programs as stated in the NCAA constitution or
incidental to them.8 7 It is an educational norm that students re-
ceive academic credit but may not also receive compensation for
academic work.88 Some students, such as graduate students, and
those engaged in co-operative educational programs, often have
the option of pursuing projects with private employers for course
credit or compensation, but not both. This normative proposition
would hold in intercollegiate athletics if student-athletes received
course credit for their athletic participation. Not only do they not
receive such credit, the awarding of such credit is essentially prohib-
ited under NCAA rules.89 In light of that fact, the strength of the
educational basis for the amateur rule is diluted.
Even so, the theoretical principle of amateurism is consistent
with educational primacy. A university that paid salaries to student-
athletes in exchange for their participation or used professional
players may lose sight of educational primacy in its athletic pro-
gram. Participants would be expected, in contravention of Profes-
sor Allison's educational primary principle, to be athletes first, as
universities would expect them to provide athletic performances
commensurate with their compensation. Moreover, the compensa-
tion of student-athletes as employees would usher in radical
changes in the structure of intercollegiate athletic programs. Ath-
letic departments that currently operate specific programs costing
more than the revenues that they generate would cease to do so as
87. See Davis, supra note 7, at 270-73 (alluding to importance of college athlet-
ics). The percentage of student-athletes in the student body is perhaps the most
powerful argument for incidentiality. Intercollegiate athletics competition is of-
fered to an extremely small portion of the total student population. Most universi-
ties probably offer less than 600 hundred participation opportunities. The
percentage of the student body that participates will vary. In a large university of
60,000 students, the percentage is about 1%. In a small university of 2000 stu-
dents, the percentage would be about 30%, but small universities would be ex-
pected to have a smaller program.
88. See id. at 276 (discussing orchestra and dance as examples where goal is to
"define and develop useful skills"). There are exceptions for co-operative educa-
tion programs.
89. See generally NCAA MANUAL, supra note 18, § 16 (discussing awards, bene-
fits, and expenses for enrolled student-athletes). Under NCAA rules, a university
may not provide a benefit to student-athletes not provided to students in general.
This includes any type of treatment, including course scheduling, special courses
and the like. Since universities do not have participation opportunities for all stu-
dents in intercollegiate athletic competition, awarding credit to student-athletes so
engaged would violate the special benefit rule. The special benefit rule often pro-
duces unjust results. Theoretically, a student-athlete who obtains a quarter from a
coach to make a call from a pay telephone violates the special benefit rule.
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the magnitude of labor costs turn then into profit-oriented
operations. 90
That argument, though, has an inherent flaw. The NCAA
mandates amateurism to prevent its members, institutions of higher
education, from harming student-athletes. "We would pay you for
generating all the revenue you do, but we would hurt if we did."
Universities through institutional enforcement of educational pri-
macy could control these harms. Just because an institution pays
student-athletes for generating revenue does not mean it must abol-
ish educational primacy.
The second justification for NCAA mandated amateurism is
driven by athletic concerns.91 The amateur standard helps preserve
competitive balance on the playing field. Universities field teams
which compete against others with athletes of high caliber, but
which are not yet the best athletes in the world. Professional ath-
letes do not possess status as such merely because they are paid;
they are paid because the quality of their athletic skill is high
enough that someone is willing to pay compensation for their per-
formance. If amateurism in intercollegiate athletics were abol-
ished, universities would pay the best athletes to play for them,
thereby producing disparities in the caliber of teams and creating a
competitive imbalance in the playing arena. Moreover, universities
would disregard educational primacy and use "ringers" or athletes
who are students in name only. There are two flaws with this justifi-
cation. For one thing, the evil to be avoided very closely resembles
the status quo. For another, the evil is something that educational
institutions might do, not the student-athlete. As stated above, edu-
cational primacy could still be maintained.
The third reason is that observed by the Supreme Court in
NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma.92 The mem-
bers of the NCAA are engaged in the production and sale of a spe-
90. See generally Davis, supra note 7, at 322-26 (noting pragmatic concerns).
strained by educational primacy. The disavowal of educational primacy as a con-
straint would lead to a very different environment for student-athletes. Student-
athlete welfare is a major concern of the NCAA. The "Principle of Student-Athlete
Welfare" is second only to the "Principle of Institutional Control and Responsibil-
ity" in the NCAA constitution. See also NCAA MANuAL, supra note 18, § 2.2 (stating,
"Intercollegiate athletics programs shall be conducted in a manner designed to
protect and enhance the physical and educational welfare of student-athletes.").
91. For a discussion of athletics and amateurism, see infra notes 92-95 and
accompanying text.
92. 468 U.S. 85, 106-13 (1984) (holding that record supported district court's
conclusion that NCAA unreasonably restrained trade under Sherman Act).
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cific product: amateur college athletics.9 3 There is great economic
demand among sports fans for such competition. The spectator de-
mand may be, although uncertain, substantially less for intercollegi-
ate athletic competitions with paid athletes. Revenues for college
athletic programs would be lower. The most compelling reason for
suppressing the value given to student-athletes in exchange for
their participation through the maintenance of mandatory ama-
teurism is economic advantage to NCAA member institutions.94 If
universities can honor educational primacy in operating athletic
programs, the maintenance of "a clear line of demarcation between
intercollegiate athletics and professional sports" is not essential
other than to preserve an economic market.9 5
The line of demarcation is the formal justification provided by
the NCAA.96 The line is drawn, however, at compensation in form
only. Colleges and universities compensate student-athletes, and
NCAA rules merely regulate the amount and form of that compen-
sation. It is true that student-athletes are not permitted to receive
compensation for their athletic skill from anyone. This includes en-
dorsement income. It is also true that the compensation limitation
applies to periods before the athlete became subject to NCAA rules.
NCAA members may not use athletes who have ever received com-
pensation. Although these explicit limitations do differentiate in-
tercollegiate athletics from professional sports, the line between
them is not visible to observers of both. Notwithstanding the com-
pensation limitations, intercollegiate athletics offer athletic compe-
tition among elite athletes just like professional sports. What truly
distinguishes intercollegiate athletics is the use of students who are
relatively young adults. 97 This occurs because of the "Five-Year
Rule," which calls for the student-athlete to complete his or her
participation in intercollegiate competition within five years.98 To
93. See id. at 101 (stating, "what the NCAA ... market[s] ... is competition
itself - contests between competing institutions.").
94. See Broyles, supra note 8, at 540-41 & n.291 (outlining benefits to colleges
and universities). Student-athletes may also benefit from mandated amateurism to
the extent that it makes additional participation opportunities available.
95. NCAA CONST. art. 1.3.1; see also Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. at
102 (stating that fact that student-athletes are not paid is integral part of "product"
NCAA markets).
96. See NCAA CONST. art. 1.3.1 (articulating purpose of NCAA).
97. See Mathewson, supra note 4, at 39 (noting that most student-athletes are
eighteen to twenty-four years old).
98. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 18, § 14.2.1. Eligibility rules do not provide
an express age limit so there are exceptions. Athletes who choose military service
before attending college may begin their eligibility at an older age because they
are exempt from the Five-Year Rule. See id. § 14.2.1.2 (discussing service exemp-
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the extent that compensation provides any demarcation, it is one of
degree. Intercollegiate athletics involve modestly compensated ath-
letes. Unfortunately, the emphasis on amateurism ties the regula-
tion of compensation to eligibility - a linkage that permeates
academic issues as well.
As a practical matter, the class of athletes who qualify as ama-
teurs is larger than the class of athletes who also qualify as students.
Athletes must qualify for both categories at the time they begin in-
tercollegiate athletic competition and until eligibility expires. To
field teams, universities must recruit from the pool of those who
not only meet the amateur standards but also qualify for college
student status.
C. The Student Standard
The standards for student eligibility are set forth in Article 14
of the NCAA Bylaws. These standards are cumbersome and befit-
ting of an organization subject to the constraint of athletic primacy.
For virtually all purposes, other than athletics at universities gov-
erned by educational primacy, a student is anyone who is enrolled
as a student to take classes and who pays the required tuition.
Under Article 14 of the NCAA Bylaws, it is not enough for an ath-
lete to be enrolled as a student and to matriculate as such. Conse-
quently, not all students qualify as students under NCAA student
eligibility standards.
The NCAA rules view the term "student-athlete" as a substan-
tive, rather than formalistic, one.9 9 In general, to be eligible as a
student-athlete, a student must "be enrolled in at least a minimum
full-time program of studies, be in good academic standing and
maintain satisfactory progress toward a baccalaureate or equivalent
degree." 100 This bylaw, on its face, is uncontroversial. Eligibility as
a student-athlete, however, does not begin here. This bylaw provi-
sion prescribes a general principle of the minimum requirements
necessary for continuing eligibility. Article 14 makes it clear that
actions of the student-athlete prior to enrollment must be consid-
ered for a determination of initial eligibility. Initial eligibility re-
tions to the Five-Year Rule). The NCAA has also carved out a special exception for
women who attended college when there were fewer participation opportunities
for them and subsequently return to college. See id. § 14.2.1.4 (discussing female
student-athletes enrolled prior to 1981-82).
99. See id. § 14.01.2; see also Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. at 98 n.16
(noting purpose of NCAA is to insure that student-athlete is fully integrated into
academic endeavors).
100. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 18, § 14.01.2.
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quires a determination that amateur status exists and that a student-
athlete's academic background meets certain objective standards
showing that the student is capable of college work.
Unfortunately, NCAA eligibility rules defining student status
suppress the perceived value that universities pay student-athletes in
exchange for their participation. To begin, the definition of stu-
dent status is driven by athletic concerns rather than academic or
institutional ones. An amateur athlete is eligible to participate in
intercollegiate athletics if the athlete is a student. Students may be
further classified as full or part-time, depending upon the number
of classes for which they have enrolled.101
The NCAA has promulgated uniform minimum academic en-
try requirements to determine which amateur athletes qualify for
student status, and are, therefore, eligible for participation in ath-
letics. The uniform standards have been promulgated because
each university has its own standards for determining who should
be offered student status, and these standards vary substantially
from university to university. Uniform standards are used in inter-
collegiate athletics for two principal purposes. First, the rules pre-
vent the exploitation of athletes who are unprepared for college.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the rules are designed to
maintain competitive balance in the arena. A basic assumption is
that there is a class of superb athletes whose academic prowess is
inversely related to their athletic ability. To allow some universities
access to that pool because of lower entry standards would provide
those universities a competitive advantage over universities whose
academic standards preclude access. Minimum standards help
market intercollegiate competition to the public as amateur compe-
tition, but uniform minimum standards are not essential. In prac-
tice, universities do employ different minimum entry standards.
For example, the minimum standards at Ivy League institutions are
higher than at many other NCAA member institutions.
Uniform minimum academic entry standards have evolved
through several stages. Nearly thirty years ago, the NCAA employed
the infamous "1.600 Rule." An incoming freshman was eligible for
student status if the athlete predicted a 1.600 grade point average
for his or her freshman year. Freshmen, however, were not eligible
for varsity competition. Because the rule had such modest expecta-
tions, some conferences, most notably the Atlantic Coast Confer-
101. To be eligible as a student-athlete, full-time status is required. See id.
§ 14.01.2 (requiring full-time status); see also id. § 14.1.6.2.2 (defining full-time as
twelve hours).
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ence, established significantly higher ground floors. 10 2 Aside from
its modesty, the 1.600 rule was controversial for other reasons. The
predicted grade point average was computed by using the scholastic
grade point average and a standardized test score. Although the
1.600 rule was challenged unsuccessfully in Parish v. NCAA, 10 3 the
standardized test score component was dropped so that a 2.0 high
school grade point average was required for eligibility.10 4 In 1983,
the NCAA enacted the infamous "Proposition 48," which required
an athlete to have a minimum standardized test score and a mini-
mum scholastic average in certain core subjects. 10 5 Most recently,
the NCAA has made the Proposition 48 standards more stringent
with the promulgation of the additionally controversial Proposition
16.106
Both Proposition 48 and Proposition 16 are as much public
relations policies as they are academic substance policies. Their
principal function was not to increase the value of the educational
opportunity afforded to student-athletes, but to lessen the image
that the NCAA and its members were offering professional sports.
The principal motive behind these uniform standards was based on
the premise that competitive balance in the sports arena required
that those universities with higher entry standards should not suffer
a competitive disadvantage when competing against universities
with lower entry standards.
Academic critics often argue that minimum standards are nec-
essary to increase the value of the educational opportunity received
by student-athletes. Uniform minimum standards do increase the
value of the educational opportunity to the extent that athletes are
better prepared to handle college work. This point is attractive to
many academics: if the university is going to pay athletes in the cur-
rency of educational opportunity, the university should not exploit
athletes who are unable to spend the currency. Yet, this reasoning
102. The Atlantic Coast Conference required a controversial minimum 800
SAT score for years. See Duane Hoffman, Triangle Suffers Major Bowl Famine, NEws
'JflEtktrt-t, t'L. 311, 1 .99J3, at C5'.
103. 361 F. Supp. 1220, 1221 (W.D. La. 1973), affd, 506 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir.
1975) (noting that plaintiffs requested injunction against NCAA enforcement of
ruling that would declare them ineligible to compete in interscholastic athletic
competition).
104. See Shropshire, supra note 73, at 143 (discussing colorblind creation and
revision of NCAA initial eligibility requirements for prospective student-athletes).
105. See Timothy Davis, The Myth of the Superspade: The Persistence of Racism in
College Athletics, 22 FoRDHim URB. L.J. 615, 664-65 n.255 (1995) (discussing gener-
ally racism in collegiate athletics and its harmful consequences).
106. See NCAA MANuAL, supra note 18, § 14.3.1.1 (detailing additional criteria
student-athletes must meet prior to college admission and graduation).
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emphasizes the lack of responsibility universities assume for adding
value to the education opportunity.
If an athlete meets the minimum entry requirements, doing so
does not ensure student status unless the athlete also meets contin-
uing academic eligibility standards.'0 7 The "satisfactory progress to-
ward a degree" rule has been recognized as inadequate. For
example, in Hall v. University of Minnesota,108 an athlete had accu-
mulated more than ninety credit hours over three years that did not
count toward a degree. 10 9 The athlete sued successfully when the
university terminated his athletic eligibility by denying him admis-
sion into a degree program.
The inefficacy of the standard was demonstrated publicly in
the Jan Kemp and Norby Walters scandals. Jan Kemp, an instructor
in an academic support program at the University of Georgia, ex-
posed the manipulation of the program to maintain the academic
eligibility of athletes. °10 In United States v. Walters,"' Walters was
convicted of defrauding universities by signing agency contracts
with student-athletes in violation of NCAA rules. The conviction
was ultimately overturned.11 2 As a defense to fraud charges, Wal-
ters asserted that he could not have defrauded universities because
they were engaged in academic chicanery to maintain the academic
eligibility of student-athletes. u 3 The defense was successful with re-
spect to one count of fraud involving the University of Iowa. 1 4
107. See id. § 14.01.1 (stating, "An institution shall not permit a student-ath-
lete to represent it in intercollegiate athletics competition unless the student-ath-
lete meets all applicable eligibility requirements."). A student-athlete must be
enrolled in a program of studies leading to a baccalaureate degree or in a graduate
or professional school at the university where the athlete attended as an under-
graduate, in order to participate in intercollegiate athletics. See id. § 14.1.7.
108. 530 F. Supp. 104 (D. Minn. 1982).
109. See id. at 105 (stating that at defendant's general college, plaintiff en-
rolled in non-baccalaureate degree program that was terminated upon plaintiffs
completion of approximately ninety credit hours).
110. See Kemp v. Ervin, 651 F. Supp. 495, 499 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (stating that
"nine student athletes were 'exited' from the development studies program into
regular university curriculum, though each student received a 'D' in English dur-
ing their fourth quarter."). University policy requires students to achieve a mini-
mum grade of "C".
111. 997 F.2d 1219 (7th Cir. 1993).
112. See id. at 1221 (mentioning that Walters signed fifty-eight college football
players to contracts while they were still playing and offered money and cars to
them).
113. See Ken Stephens, Eligibility Stance in Need of Reform: Iowa President Draws
Coaches' Ire for Vowing to Sideline Freshmen, DALLAs MORNING NEws, Apr. 22, 1989, at
14B.
114. See id.
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The most famous demonstration of the failure of minimum en-
trance and satisfactory progress standards was the Kevin Ross deba-
cle at Creighton University. Ross was recruited by the university
and attended it for four years on a basketball scholarship. Al-
though functionally illiterate, he maintained his eligibility for four
basketball seasons. Out of a sense of embarrassment, the university
paid for him to attend a prep school. He subsequently earned a
graduate equivalency diploma and sued Creighton for the cost of
tuition for a legitimate college education. 115
As a result of those and other recent scandals, the NCAA has
added teeth to the standard with a series of objective measures of
satisfactory progress. Student-athletes must timely designate a ma-
jor course of study and earn a minimum number of credit hours
and cumulative grade point average toward the major.1 16 The pre-
mise of the reforms is that objective measures of progress should be
used to assure that athletes are taking advantage of the educational
opportunity given to them. The reforms, however, share the weak-
ness of the earlier regime: the NCAA standards emphasize mini-
mum value rather than facilitating the maximization of educational
value. Universities maintain incentives to encourage students to
avoid too much risk in pursuing an academic program because of
the increased likelihood that eligibility will be lost. The NCAA de-
clined to reconsider these reforms in the face of pressure from the
Black Coaches Association, 117 but is now reconsidering them in
light of Cureton v. NCAA 118 and other litigation.
III. THE SUPPRESSION OF VALUE
A. General
The suppression of compensation to student-athletes under
the NCAA's amateurism standard has been addressed in antitrust
law scholarship. 119 This scholarship generally casts the NCAA as a
115. See Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410, 411-12 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting
that Ross filed suit nainqt Creighton alleoina "educational mlralpr'ti-e" h---
he was not provided with adequate education and was not prepared for employ-
ment after college).
116. See NCAA MANuAL, supra note 18, § 14.4.3.
117. See Timothy Davis, African-American Student-Athletes: Marginalizing the
NCAA Regulatory Structure?, 6 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 199, 202-08 (1996) (noting that at
1996 NCAA Convention, NCAA rejected plan to redefine partial qualifiers so as to
include student-athletes who would otherwise qualify under Proposition 48).
118. 198 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 1999) (challenging minimum SAT score require-
ment for freshman-year varsity intercollegiate athletic participation).
119. The author notes that the legality of eligibility standards under the anti-
trust laws is beyond the scope of this Article.
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cartel of economic actors who agree to control costs by fixing the
compensation members pay student-athletes in exchange for the
students' participation in intercollegiate athletics. 120 If each uni-
versity independently determined the amount of aid to be given to
its student-athletes in furtherance of its educational mission, this
suppression of value would not exist. Outside the athletics sphere,
colleges and universities have shown a remarkable willingness to
compete for students with financial aid. This competition results in
higher financial aid awards to students. As a result, some colleges
and universities have sought to control their costs by forming car-
tels to agree to uniform formulas for awarding financial aid. 121 The
cost containment agreements in intercollegiate athletics are far
more pervasive. The magnitude of the suppression of value is gen-
erated through uniform collective action on the part of universities.
While effects of the value suppression of the amateur standards
are obvious, the suppression of educational value is not. Indeed,
the NCAA's definition of "amateur student-athlete" in and of itself
is premised upon suppressing the value universities deliver to stu-
dent-athletes in exchange for their participation. Two commenta-
tors writing after the promulgation of Proposition 48 examined its
legality under antitrust laws, but they primarily explored the group
boycott implications of the rule rather than its suppression of
value. 122 Two other commentators have concluded that NCAA
rules on amateurism and academic standards do not suppress
value. 123 One commentator, writing prior to recent NCAA reforms,
found little evidence that "the NCAA is truly interested in reforms
120. SeeJames V. Koch, The Economic Realities of Amateur Sports Organization, 61
IND. L.J. 9, 15-16 (1986) (noting that NCAA has acted primarily as economic entity
and supported activities leading to "cartelization"); see also Mitten, supra note 11, at
76 (stating that "invalidation of current NCAA restraints on price competition
would allow universities to align themselves consistent with economic potential of
their athletic programs").
121. See United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 677 (3d Cir. 1993) (men-
tioning "a trade-off may need to be made between providing some financial aid to
a large number of the most needy students or allowing the free market to bestow
the limited financial aid on the very few most talented who may not need financial
aid to attain their academic goals.").
122. See Deborah E. Klein & William Buckley Briggs, Proposition 48 and the
Business of Intercollegiate Athletics: Potential Antitrust Ramifications under the Sherman
Act, 67 DENV. U. L. REv. 301, 302 (1990) (stating "[t] he Justice Department is in-
vestigating whether certain colleges and universities, by setting similar levels of
tuition and financial aid, are in violation of the anti-trust laws.").
123. See Richard B. McKenzie & E. Thomas Sullivan, Does the NCAA Exploit
College Athletes? - An Economics and Legal Reinterpretation, 32 ANTrTRUST BuLL. 373,
383 (1987) (mentioning that NCAA rules and regulations can enhance reputation
to athletes and non-athletes associated with college athletics).
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that have the effect of enhancing academic standards." 24 Further-
more, enhanced standards may also suppress educational value.
None of the previous analyses significantly explore the suppres-
sion of educational value resulting from the legal rules regarding
the contractual relationship between student-athletes and their uni-
versities. 125 Under the terms of the contractual agreement, the stu-
dent-athlete is obligated to maintain his or her academic and
amateur eligibility as a condition of receiving the university's con-
sideration, as established in the seminal case of Taylor v. Wake Forest
University.126 The student-athlete is also obligated to participate in
his or her sport as a condition of receiving a scholarship.
127
In Taylor, a football player performed below the minimum aca-
demic standards at the university. He was allowed to reduce his
participation level in order to improve his academic performance
to eligibility levels. The player discovered that he could perform
better in the classroom if he minimized his athletic participation.
When he stopped participating in football practice during his soph-
omore year, the university revoked his athletic scholarship. After
he graduated, he sued the university for tuition, and the court
found in favor of the university.
Although Taylor is recognized as the seminal case establishing
an athletic scholarship as a contract, the opinion is even more re-
markable in its conceptualization of the terms of that contract. A
scholarship athlete contracts with the university, but the university's
obligation to provide value to an athlete is conditioned upon the
athlete's eligibility. Athletic eligibility is in part based upon aca-
demic eligibility. In contract law parlance, athletic eligibility is both
a condition precedent and a condition subsequent. Initial aca-
demic eligibility requirements are conditions precedent to athletic
eligibility while continuing academic eligibility requirements are
conditions subsequent. The conditional nature of eligibility pro-
vides the university with huge incentives to invest in recruiting eligi-
ble players and to maintain their eligibility. Student-athletes face
similar incentives. Athletic eligibility, .. 11_ LIIanr. .  .mic
achievement, is the structural mantra brought about by uniform
athletic rules.
124. Id.
125. See Mathewson, supra note 4, at 49; see also Davis, supra note 10, at 769
(detailing existing contractual relationship).
126. 191 S.E.2d 379, 382 (N.C. Ct. App. 1972) (discussing that considerations
in scholastic award included both academic and athletic or physical eligibility).
127. See id. (noting that this includes participation in and attendance at
practice).
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B. Impact in Intercollegiate Athletics
Unlike athletes in the secondary school setting and other ama-
teur settings, college scholarship athletes theoretically sell their ath-
letic services in exchange for an educational opportunity.128
Conditions precedent in the collegiate setting lower the perceived
value of that educational opportunity. Such conditions do so be-
cause they raise the price that the student-athlete must pay in ex-
change for the educational opportunity, which does not increase in
value for a particular student-athlete.1 29 Conditions subsequent
suppress the perceived and actual value paid to college athletes. If
a condition subsequent is not satisfied, the athlete is ineligible, and
the university has no further obligation to provide the educational
opportunity. Thus, the actual value paid to student-athletes may be
suppressed. Likewise, the perceived value of the educational op-
portunity must be discounted by the probability that eligibility may
be lost.1 3 0 The contracts have renewable one-year terms. The fail-
ure to meet continuing eligibility standards means the renewal
right and its value are lost. That lower perceived value should re-
sult in less persistence in academic pursuits by student-athletes and
a concomitant reduction in the value of the educational opportu-
nity. Thus, the "heart and soul" of the consideration to be paid to
athletes by universities is suppressed by the very nature of the con-
tractual arrangement.
The eligibility structure thus provides incentives to universities
and students to focus primarily on athletic eligibility and engage in
conduct that increases the probability that eligibility will be obtaina-
ble and maintainable.131  Universities must invest substantial
amounts in athletic training and development in order to enhance
the marketability of the university's athletic product that it sells and
128. The right of high school students to play sports is conditioned upon aca-
demic performance, but such students do not contract with schools to play in ex-
change for an education. The provision of an educational opportunity is not part
of Olympic sports.
129. See Lawrence DeBrock et al., The Economics of Persistence: Graduation Rates
of Athletes as Labor Market Choice, 31 J. HUM. RESOURCES 512, 516 (1996) (noting
argument that student-athletes are like any other rational economic actor and
choose labor opportunities based upon perceived value compared to other labor
opportunities).
130. See Taylor, 191 S.E.2d at 381 (discussing termination of scholarship after
two years). At the time of Taylor, universities could offer four-year scholarships. See
id. at 380.
131. See Monica L. Emerick, The University/Student-Athlete Relationship: Duties
Giving Rise to a Potential Educational Hindrance Claim, 44 UCLA L. REv. 865, 874
(1997) (arguing that economic goals of athletic departments cause universities to
stifle deliberately educational needs of student-athletes).
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from which it derives value. If student-athletes lose their eligibility,
the university loses its investment. Accordingly, universities have
substantial incentives to help student-athletes maintain their eligi-
bility. Academic advisors and support programs portend educa-
tional motivations, but their principal function is to assist in the
maintenance of eligibility. Universities have disincentives for stu-
dent-athletes to take risks by maximizing their academic achieve-
ment. The more difficult the course, the greater the risk of a grade
that may destroy eligibility.
The incentive structure was demonstrated in Hall v. University
of Minnesota132 and Ross v. Creighton University.133 In Hall, the uni-
versity permitted the student-athlete to accumulate credit that did
not count toward a degree for the purpose of maintaining his eligi-
bility for basketball. Administrators at the University of Minnesota
took the institution's commitment to educational primacy seriously
and refused to admit him into a degree granting program that they
believed would be used by the student solely to continue his athletic
eligibility. Although the case shows a structural flaw between those
responsible for athletics and those responsible for academics within
the university, the administrators did not act until after the univer-
sity had maintained the athlete's eligibility for three years. The de-
cision to deny him admission thus ended the university's obligation
to provide him with any further value, educational or otherwise. In
Ross, the university provided academic support to its student-ath-
letes, including tutorial services. The principal thrust of the aca-
demic support program, as with many college athletic programs,
was the maintenance of the student-athlete's athletic eligibility.
Neither of the student-athletes in Hall or Ross was blameless.
The student-athlete in Ross did not take not take advantage of the
university's academic support services or attend classes. Given his
preparation level for college, those services probably had little
meaningful value to him. Since he was contractually obligated to
maintain his eligibility, he had substantial incentive to find other
- ig . .. ... .  . . ... .. .. ... ... . . ... . .. .. ..
lesg 17 orous patls to ObtadlI taldt IJCLV. Ile I LIeIL-dLI-IleLe I1
Hall behaved in a manner similar to the student in Ross. However,
he explicitly stated his understanding that the university was only
132. 530 F. Supp. 104, 104-11 (D. Minn. 1982) (issuing injunction requiring
university to admit Hall to degree program and to declare him eligible to compete
in varsity basketball competition).
133. 957 F.2d 410, 416-17 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that appellate court af-
firmed lower court's ruling that university is not liable in tort for educational mal-
practice where student-athlete fails to earn degree but holding that university may
be liable for breach of contract where it made specific promises).
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interested in his basketball ability and had no interest in providing
him with a valuable college education. Many universities have aca-
demic support and tutorial services programs available for the en-
tire student body. Student-athletes may use these services but are
faced with the same constraints as the athletes in Ross and Hall -
they must maintain eligibility.
Taylor conferred a legal blessing on this incentive structure
when it held by implication that a university's obligation is limited
to providing the minimum required standards for eligibility. The
court found significant the fact that the player discontinued his par-
ticipation at a time when he was performing above the minimum
academic standards.134 An analysis of its specific facts reveals clear
judicial acceptance of the proposition that a student-athlete may
not reduce his or her participation level in order to perform above
the minimum eligibility standard. Furthermore, the court implied
that it might have permitted reduced athletic participation only
where the athlete was performing below minimum academic
standards.
The NCAA could enforce its rules requiring member universi-
ties to honor the promises they make to their student-athletes in
the recruitment process and otherwise. Since universities have an
incentive to invest in attaining the minimum required, higher mini-
mums should mean that universities would do more in order to
meet those requirements. The thrust of the rules, however, is not
to require universities to do more but to require student-athletes to
do more to meet those minimums. Universities are required to
find and use student-athletes for whom the education received will
be more valuable, but they are not otherwise required to do any-
thing to provide value.
The controversy is over those individuals with superior athletic
skills but, presumably, "questionable" academic skills. 135 Uniform
rules preclude members on the playing field from using excep-
tional athletes that competing institutions cannot match. 136 The
134. See Taylor, 191 S.E.2d at 381 (mentioning that despite improvement in
plaintiffs grade point average, plaintiff chose not to participate in regular practice
sessions with football team).
135. Cureton notes that when student-athletes take standardized tests that eval-
uate their performance, their academic skills become suspicious when their results
return. See Cureton v. NCAA, 37 F. Supp. 2d 687, 690 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (noting that
two African-American students, who failed to meet initial eligibility standards de-
spite strong high school academic records, were challenging the "questionable"
nature of their academic skills under federal anti-discrimination laws).
136. An institution subject to educational primacy with high academic stan-
dards is expected to forego potential student-athletes who do not meet the institu-
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absence of those athletes reduces the value of professional training
given to those student-athletes who are included by the universities.
Thus, the actual value given by universities in exchange for partici-
pation decreases; however, since very few student-athletes have a
meaningful opportunity for professional careers, this impact on
value should be minimal.
Many well-intentioned reformers have attempted to address
this problem with stricter academic standards, thus placing the bur-
den on student-athletes, instead of on universities to increase the
value of the educational opportunity. 137 Perhaps, the most influen-
tial reformer has been the Knight Commission, which made several
unsurprising recommendations. 13 8 The commission proposed a
larger role for college presidents but not for university faculties.
The structure places the principal responsibility for the education
of student-athletes on the athletes themselves, and lodges institu-
tional accountability in the athletic department rather than the
faculty. The Knight Commission recently reconvened to assess the
impact of its reforms. 139
Thus far, all major calls for reform recognize the existence of
the exploitation of student-athletes and the necessity of its minimi-
zation. In fact, the NCAA even makes minimization a major princi-
ple. 140 However, reformers frequently assume that if exploitation
occurs, it is because there is something wrong with the student-ath-
lete, rather than the university. 141 These informers believe that the
solution is to regulate the university's ability to exploit by enforcing
stricter academic standards. Thus, the NCAA in several controver-
sial conventions has submitted to the external pressures for reform
and has amended its constitution and bylaws as noted above in or-
tion's standards. In fact, many NCAA member institutions follow this normative
proposition but within certain limits. The purpose of uniform standards is to pre-
vent other institutions with lower standards or those that are willing to undertake
greater risk from using athletes than institutions with higher standards or those
that are more risk adverse.
137. Sep Yasser, supra note 12. at 136 (discussing author's blueprint for re-
structuring of intercollegiate athletics); see also Smith, supra note 12, at 567 (dis-
cussing need to make intercollegiate athletic programs part of accreditation
process and desirability of requiring filing of academic impact statements in con-
junction with each legislative proposal considered by NCAA).
138. See COMM'N ON INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS, KNIGHT FOUND. REPORT:
KEEPING FAITH WITH THE STUDENT-ATHLETE - A NEW MODEL FOR INTERCOLLEGIATE
ATHLETICS (1991).
139. Gary T. Brown, NCAA Leaders Testify Before New Edition of Knight Commis-
sion, NCAA NEWS, Sept. 11, 2000, at 1.
140. See NCAA MANuAL, supra note 18, § 2.11.
141. See e.g., Davis, supra note 117, at 212; Yasser, supra note 12, at 136.
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der to implement these changes. 142 Although academic eligibility
has been redefined to limit those athletes who are more likely to
derive value from their educational opportunity, these reforms do
not eliminate the suppression of value. 143 Unfortunately, the end
result is that none of the proposals calls for the regulation of com-
pensation other than in stricter eligibility requirements. Therefore,
an athlete is ineligible unless he can benefit from the education.
C. Impact on African-American Student-Athletes
No student-athlete has prevailed against NCAA amateurism
rules on antitrust grounds because such rules have been analyzed
under the "rule of reason," which weighs justifications for these
rules against their adverse economic effects. Although student-ath-
letes have challenged initial eligibility rules, none have been on an-
titrust grounds. Additionally, there are no reported cases in which
a student-athlete has challenged continuing eligibility rules. In
light of dicta in cases such as Board of Regents of the University of
Oklahoma v. NCAA,144 such rules are unlikely to be invalidated
under existing law. 145 The educational foundations of these rules
will almost always outweigh any harm to student-athletes and it is
the author's contention that these harms include the suppression
of educational value to student-athletes.1 46
One of the principal justifications now ventured by the NCAA
for its academic eligibility rules is the prevention of exploitation of
African-American student-athletes where the eligibility paradox is
also present.147 On one hand, universities have exploited African-
142. For a history of NCAA academic reform, see Shropshire, supra note 73, at
143-45 (discussing generally purpose of initial eligibility rules and changes to them
over time).
143. See id.
144. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
145. See Klein & Briggs, supra note 122, at 308.
146. See Davis, supra note 7, at 269 (1994).
147. See Cureton v. NCAA, 37 F. Supp. 2d 687, 699 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (noting
that suppression is more pernicious in the case of African-American student-ath-
letes - an effect that is visible in the differential in graduation rates). The gradua-
tion rates of African-American student-athletes in sports such as basketball and
football indicate that the actual value delivered by universities to them is less than
that received by other ethnic groups. See id. For the freshman class entering in
1990, the graduation rates for African-American males in basketball was 39%; in
football, 45%. See id. The graduation rates for Caucasian male student-athletes
during that period in those sports were 58% and 61% respectively. See id. I do not
offer the observation here to "point a finger" and blame universities. To the ex-
tent that systemic forces have suppressed value of the educational opportunity, it
has been done so for all athletes, but the suppression is greater for African-Ameri-
can student-athletes.
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American athletes by tendering an educational opportunity with lit-
de, if any value, to a large number of student-athletes. 148 On the
other hand, the reform of NCAA academic rules has attempted to
solve the problem by making it more difficult for a disproportion-
ate number of African-Americans to obtain an educational opportu-
nity. This racially discriminatory impact of initial eligibility rules
has been well addressed in legal scholarship. Professor Linda
Greene was the first legal scholar to explore challenges to initial
eligibility rules using legal theories under antidiscrimination law.149
Additionally, Professor Yasser has also written on the subject, and
Professors Shropshire and Davis have revisited this issue in recent
scholarship. 150 Currently, these legal theories are being tested in
Cureton.151 Although initial eligibility rules should theoretically in-
crease the value of the educational opportunity available to those
student-athletes who are permitted to participate, a person who is
excluded does not gain that value.
The suppression of the actual value of the educational oppor-
tunity by uniform initial eligibility rules to student-athletes, includ-
ing African-Americans, appears to be limited. 152 Professor
Shropshire, however, has argued that the initial eligibility standards
have the unintended effect of decreasing the value of the educa-
tional opportunity because the rules enhance the social stigmatiza-
tion of African-American student-athletes.153 Yet the suppression of
value by continuing eligibility standards may be substantial. Al-
though the graduation rates for African-Americans are lower than
those for Caucasians, that differential alone is not sufficient enough
to conclude that the degree of suppression is greater for African-
Americans. Even though graduation rates for all student-athletes,
148. See Davis, supra note 105, at 664-65.
149. See Linda S. Greene, The New NCAA Rules of the Game: Academic Integrity or
Racism?, 28 ST. Louis U. LJ. 101 (1984).
150. See Davis, supra note 117, at 208-12; Davis, supra note 105, at 660-78;
Shropshire, supra note 73, at 14147; Ray Yasser, The Black Athletes'Equal Protection
Case Against the NCAA's New Academic Standards, 19 GoNZ. L. REv. 83 (1983).
151. See Adam S. Taylor & M. Darrel Traub, Cuaeion v. CAA; c g. .u..izing
Proposition 16 and Its Disparate Impact on Prospective Minority Student-Athletes, 7 SPORTS
L.J. 59 (2000).
152. Indeed, proponents of uniform rules argue that after the implementa-
tion of Proposition 48 higher graduation rates have yielded higher value. How-
ever, such claims must be balanced against changes in the number of graduates.
Graduation rates may be higher, but one must question whether more African-
Americans are graduating. The jury must await a study of the application of the
commutative property of multiplication. Moreover, study also needs to be made of
the degrees those graduates are obtaining and whether they are getting optimum
educational value.
153. See Shropshire, supra note 73, at 144-45.
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including African-Americans, have increased since the promulga-
tion of Proposition 48, that increase fails to show that the continu-
ing eligibility framework does not suppress value. Thus, there is
evidentiary proof that the suppression of value is less than it was
prior to the passage of Proposition 48.
There is, however, at least one circumstance where a larger
magnitude of suppression of value for African-American student-
athletes may occur. The incentives for universities to invest in the
maintenance of eligibility rather than academic achievement may
be greater due to stereotypes. Universities with athletic and aca-
demic officials who possess stereotypical views of the academic capa-
bilities of African-American student-athletes may encourage them
to pursue eligibility retention instead of maximizing academic
achievement. Such students may graduate without undertaking the
most rigorous coursework despite their capabilities. 154 Some uni-
versities may cheat and spare African-American student-athletes of
the work required to obtain a degree. 155 The end result is that the
value of the educational opportunity to African-American student-
athletes has been suppressed.
The initial eligibility and continuing eligibility standards do
have a significant adverse effect on the perceived value of an educa-
tional opportunity. As noted by Professor Davis, critics of the
NCAA educational regime often explicitly presume that many Afri-
can-American athletes are unprepared and undeserving of an op-
154. See Erik M. Jensen, Taxation, the Student Athlete, and the Professionalization
of College Athletics, 1987 UTAH L. REv. 35, 36 n.4 (1987) (depicting fictional Yale
student-athlete who was described as having "a body like Tarzan's and a head like
Einstein's"); see also Michael Schinner, Touchdowns and Taxes: Are Athletic Scholar-
ships Merely Disguised Compensation, 8 AM.J. TAX POL'v 127, 144 (1989) (stating that
75% of African-American student-athletes who graduate receive physical education
degrees).
155. See Hall v. University of Minn., 530 F. Supp. 104 (D. Minn. 1982) (dis-
cussing question concerning academic standing and athletic eligibility of Univer-
sity of Minnesota basketball player). The perverse incentive structure is also
reflected in the current academic fraud scandal at the University of Minnesota. A
tutor for the basketball program has admitted that she wrote papers for members
of the team to keep them eligible. See Brian Bakst, Judge Rejects Gophers' Tutor Plea,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 25, 2000, 2000 WL 27211207. The university is suing the
former coach to recover a $1.5 million severance payment and federal prosecutors
are investigating. Id. Moreover, the NCAA has placed the university on probation
for four years and taken away five scholarships. See Joe Drape, N.C.A.A., Citing
Serious Violations, Puts Minnesota Men's Program on Probation, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25,
2000, at C27. A similar issue arose out of the University of Tennessee which has
restructured its academic advisement program for athletes as a result. See Welch
Snuggs, Tennessee Restructures Tutoring Program, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., June 23,
2000, at A53.
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portunity for a college education. 156 He further points out that it is
the educational opportunity that a large number of these presuma-
bly uneducable African-American athletes seek.' 57 By raising the
minimum initial standards, it is more difficult for them to attain
scholarships. As one's chances of obtaining a scholarship are re-
duced, the perceived value of the scholarship to a prospective col-
lege student is lessened.
Professor Davis has provided an elaborate demonstration of
how initial eligibility rules intensify the exploitation of African-
American student-athletes by universities. 15 His primary thesis is
that the conjunction of suppression of compensation by amateur-
ism rules and initial eligibility rules distorts the perceived value of
an educational opportunity offered by universities in exchange for
African-American athletic participation. 15 9 He further argues that
the NCAA, as well as many reformers, has underestimated the mag-
nitude of the distortion for African-American student-athletes. 160
Proposition 48, for example, was promulgated to address the
perceived widespread use of African-American athletes who were
unlikely to graduate. At the same time, however, African-American
student-athletes were graduating at higher rates than other African-
American students. 161 The athletic route thus offered African-
Americans a better chance to obtain a college degree than the
traditional academic route. Thus, a rational African-American
would have been encouraged to invest time in athletics that might
have been spent sharpening academic skills instead of athletic pur-
suits. Many African-Americans who made this choice found them-
selves excluded by Proposition 48. Ironically, many student-athletes
who chose to spend more time on academic pursuits found them-
selves excluded by the stricter standards of Proposition 16.162
Moreover, as the plaintiffs in Cureton were able to show, the NCAA
156. See Davis, supra note 105, at 648-49; see also Shropshire, supra note 73, at
145.
157. See Davis, supra note 105, at 648-49.
15o. See Davis, upfrfa note l17," at 2 L8-20.
159. See id. at 218-19.
160. See id.
161. See id. at 220.
162. See Cureton v. NCAA, 37 F. Supp. 2d 687, 689 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (discussing
Cureton as another aspect of distortion). The plaintiffs' academic performance in
school indicates that they sought to maximize the academic route, perhaps, at the
expense of athletic development. See id. They were both "A" students who did not
score high enough on the SAT to meet initial eligibility standards. See id. Tai
Kwan Cureton saw a drop-off in recruitment efforts by Division I universities when
he failed to obtain the requisite score. See id. His allegiance to educational pri-
macy thus cost him a college education at the type of institution he desired. See id.
20001
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had no particular basis for drawing the narrow pathways at the
points it did.163
The technical application of the cumbersome, complex NCAA
rules also creates havoc with the perceived value of the educational
opportunity. High school students must balance the time they in-
vest in academic and athletic pursuits to qualify for eligibility. Find-
ing the appropriate balance requires them to understand precisely
what the requisite academic standards are. High school students
and their parents are expected to comprehend the specific require-
ments that a student-athlete must satisfy in order to qualify for ath-
letic-based financial aid and participation. Some African-American
student-athletes who rely on high school counselors and others to
inform them accurately of the required courses end up in litigation
like Thomas and Phillip. 164 To many African-American children,
those cases demonstrate that it does not matter how hard they try to
pursue NCAA academic standards, because doing so will not mat-
ter. Rational African-American student-athletes, therefore, can jus-
tify the amount of time they invest in athletic pursuits, so long as
there are universities willing to cheat in order to maintain their ath-
letic eligibility.
Uniform continuing eligibility rules also contribute to the dis-
torted view of an educational opportunity by African-American stu-
dent-athletes. Minimum academic standards in excess of those
necessary to determine bona fide student status increase the
probability that eligibility, and concomitantly, the right to receive
value of any kind in exchange for athletic participation from a uni-
versity, may be terminated. The probability of termination in-
creases especially in cases where student-athletes have relatively
weak academic qualifications. Because the incremental increase in
the probability of termination is expected to be greater in the cases
involving African-Americans, such student-athletes will be expected
to have a higher loss of eligibility rate. A higher loss of eligibility
rate means a greater suppression of actual value. The incremental
increase in the probability that eligibility may be lost reduces the
perceived value of the educational opportunity. Accordingly, Afri-
can-Americans may be less persistent in their efforts in obtaining
educational value because of the direct correlation between the in-
Leatrice Shaw also saw a drop in recruitment but attended a Division I school and
received institutional aid. See id.
163. See id.
164. For a discussion of this litigation, see supra notes 60-67 and accompany-
ing text.
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crease in the probability of eligibility loss and their perceived value
of the educational opportunity. The magnitude of the effect on
perceived value may be exacerbated in cases of African-American
student-athletes due to the impact of racial discrimination. 65
The perceived value of the educational opportunity to many
African-American student-athletes may be affected by the existence
of professional opportunities. 166 DeBrock, Hendricks and Koenker
demonstrate the interrelationship of the perceived values of the ed-
ucational opportunity with professional opportunity and the impact
of those relative perceptions on human capital. It may be deduced
from their work that there is a direct relationship between the ef-
fort the student-athlete will expend to attain the value of an educa-
tional opportunity and its magnitude relative to the value of the
professional opportunity. While DeBrock, Hendricks and Koenker
focus on the lack of responsibility by universities for past scandals,
their work implicitly demonstrates the significance of enhanced ef-
forts on the part of universities to increase the value of an educa-
tional opportunity. Student-athletes must allocate their efforts
between educational and athletic pursuits - which is true regardless
of a professional opportunity - because of contractual commit-
ment. Student-athletes will allocate more effort in athletic pursuits,
whenever the perceived value of an educational opportunity is rela-
tively less than that of the athletic pursuit - this condition will fre-
quently occur when a professional opportunity surfaces. Thus,
universities can affect the relative perception that these student-ath-
letes possess by emphasizing the value of an educational
opportunity.
The latter point is even more significant when market effects
are taken into account. NCAA members compete against each
other for the pool of athletes who have the athletic skills to com-
pete at the collegiate level, and NCAA bylaws devote a full chapter
to the regulation of this competition.' 67 But NCAA members do
not compete merely against each other. Many of the athletes in the
pool have atldeLic skills that professional teams may also be willing
to acquire. Professional teams may also compete for student-ath-
165. See Alex M. Johnson, Hoop Dreams: Rational Behavior, Meritocratic Standards
and Affirmative Action: Why Shaquille Chooses to Play Basketball or Tell Jokes Instead of
Going to Law School (1996) (unpublished paper) (on file with author). But see Jason
W. Osborne, Race and Academic Disidentification, 89J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 1 (1997) (ar-
guing that poor academic performance of African-American males is due to aca-
demic disidentification).
166. See Davis, supra note 105, at 647-49.
167. NCAA CONST. art. 13.
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letes who develop their skills to professional caliber while participat-
ing in intercollegiate athletics. The NCAA and its members have
become more and more concerned over the number of athletes
who have bypassed intercollegiate athletics, or those who have by-
passed their eligibility for the professional ranks. This behavior is
predictable in light of the limited investment on the part of univer-
sities in academic achievement and increased suppression of value
by academic reforms. In order to compete against other buyers for
the skills of these elite student-athletes, universities will have no
choice but to increase the amount of compensation they spend on
student-athletes. This measure would take the form of additional
investments in the enhancement of the value of the educational
opportunity or monetary compensation to student-athletes.
There is some evidence to suggest that the suppression regard-
ing the value of the educational opportunity is not as problematic
for women student-athletes. 168 Graduation rates for women stu-
dent-athletes, for example, tend to surpass those of men.1 69 That
proposition also appears to hold for African-American women stu-
dent-athletes in comparison to African-American men. For exam-
ple, in the sport of basketball, African-American women in the 1990
entering class had a 58% graduation rate, whereas the graduation
rate for African-American men in that class was 39%.170 This situa-
tion was also reflected by Caucasian student-athletes as well, where
Caucasian females had a 74% graduation rate compared to 58% for
Caucasian males. 171
It is unclear why the gender disparity in graduation rates oc-
curs. Socio-economic factors may play a role, and each of the asser-
tions made below runs the risk of over-generalization. Women
student-athletes, as a group, may come from relatively more afflu-
ent backgrounds than men. Several commentators have recog-
nized that Title IX has led to the establishment of athletic
programs, where resources for such developments generally exist in
168. See Rodney K. Smith, When Ignorance is Not Bliss: In Search of Racial and
Gender Equity in Intercollegiate Athletics, 61 Mo. L. REV. 329, 334 (1996) (noting that
one commentator argues that women are shortchanged on educational value de-
rived through participation in intercollegiate athletics).
169. See Female Athletes Lead List: Women Graduate at Higher Rate, SEATrLE TIMFs,
June 30, 1995, at D5 [hereinafter Female Athletes] (noting that relevance of gradua-
tion rates to suppression of educational value should not be over emphasized). A
student-athlete may graduate without having fulfilled her potential as a student.
See id. To the extent the NCAA framework impedes that fulfillment, female ath-
letes are adversely affected even with higher graduation rates. See id.
170. See NCAA, 1997 NCAA DISION I GRADUATION-RATES SUMMARY (1997).
171. See id.
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suburban communities.1 72 This explanation may account for some
of the gender disparity among African-Americans but cannot ac-
count for all of it. The majority of African-American women in in-
tercollegiate athletics primarily participate in basketball and
track.17 3 The majority of African-American men participate in bas-
ketball and football. 17 4 In both instances, the sports in which Afri-
can-American female and male athletes tend to participate are
cultivated in urban and inner-city communities. If African-Ameri-
can men and women student-athletes come from the same commu-
nities, then other factors must account for the difference.
Perhaps the most significant factor has been the absence of
professional opportunities for women. DeBrock, Hendricks and
Koenker analyzed graduation rate data and attempted to provide
empirical support for the assertion that the existence of profes-
sional sports opportunities affects the academic efforts of student-
athletes in general, male and female, African-American, Caucasian
or other ethnicity. 7 5 According to them, the absence of profes-
sional sports opportunities results in an increase in the perceived
value of the educational opportunity and greater effort on the part
of individual athletes. 176 These academic scholars did not analyze
the differences in persistence along racial lines. The data does
show lower graduation rates for African-American women than
Caucasian women in the sport of basketball.1 77 The relationship
between the availability of professional opportunities and perceived
value of the educational opportunity by African-American women
appeared in literature before the empirical work by DeBrock, Hen-
dricks and Koenker. 178
IV. ELIGIBILITY RECONSIDERED
Student-athletes should have to meet collegiate academic stan-
dards, but uniform standards generated by an athletics organization
suppress the perceived and actual educational value. NCAA eligi-
172. See Alfred Dennis Mathewson. Black Women. Gender Equitv and the Function
at the Junction, 6 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 239, 251 (1996) (discussing generally what gen-
der equity means in relation to athletics).
173. See id. at 257.
174. See Norman R. Yetman & D. Stanley Eitzen, Racial Dynamics in American
Sport: Continuity and Change, in SPORT IN CONTEMP. Soc'Y 325-32 (1984).
175. See DeBrock et al., supra note 129, at 515.
176. See id.
177. See Female Athletes, supra note 169, at D5.
178. See Wendy Olson, Beyond Title IX: Toward an Agenda for Women and Sports
in the 1990's, 3 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 105, 105-51 (1990) (discussing impact of Title
IX on female student-athletes).
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bility rules restrain price and non-price competition among its
members. The amateurism rules amount to restraints on price
competition. The academic standards component of athletic eligi-
bility amounts to restraints on non-price competition. If the NCAA
must have amateurism restraints, it should promote the non-price
competition in educational value. Institutions subject to educa-
tional primacy should be policed to assume that they maximize the
provision of educational value rather than merely maintain
eligibility.
The new eligibility framework should be developed around five
principles. First, colleges and universities should engage openly in
competition with educational value subject to regulation by the
NCAA as an athletic organization. Such competition would be
healthy and would help regulate the abuses in the current and old
systems. Regulation of that form of competition will correct the
major legal flaw in those systems: the absence of a legal right to
educational value for student-athletes, which the NCAA could mon-
itor and regulate. On the other hand, universities that promise ed-
ucational value but fail to deliver should be subject to some form of
sanction.
Long time critics of NCAA academic policies will no doubt no-
tice that the proposed solution appears to revert back to the "home
rule" days. But, critics overlook the role that legal regime has
played. The law does not require universities to provide any more
value than NCAA rules mandate. Furthermore, courts have not re-
quired more mandates, due to the difficulty of articulating these
standards over the promise of university admission to student-ath-
letes. The NCAA should step into the breach and enforce the
promises made by universities in recruiting student-athletes. Uni-
versities should be monitored to ascertain whether they are deliver-
ing academic value to student-athletes and should be subject to
enhanced scrutiny and sanctions when they are not.
There have been proposals to modify the existing NCAA initial
eligibility regime. Professor Shropshire, for example, has called
for, among other things, the elimination of standardized tests and
freshman eligibility. 179 These proposals address the flaws in the
current system, but do not go far enough. Such measures could
still be incorporated in the solution proposed by this Article. Uni-
versities should compete for student-athletes with, among other
things, freshman eligibility. A university need not use standardized
179. See Shropshire, supra note 73, at 149-50.
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tests for admission or initial eligibility. It may eliminate freshman
ineligibility for all or just some freshmen, but there should be a
quid pro quo for this discretion. As explained below, a university
must be subject to scrutiny to assure that it is delivering academic
value. Universities that are not providing adequate educational
value should not be permitted to offer freshman eligibility in a
sport.
Second, the NCAA should consciously regulate eligibility in
furthering its athletic mission. The NCAA should continue to use
its initial and continuing eligibility standards to measure the extent
to which universities are providing academic value. Those stan-
dards, along with graduation rates and other factors, would be
transformed into institutional performance standards. For exam-
ple, an institution would be permitted to offer financial aid to stu-
dent-athletes who did not meet the initial eligibility standards. It
would not, however, be allowed to offer freshmen eligibility in a
sport unless a specified high percentage of such student-athletes
were in compliance with continuing eligibility standards or the uni-
versity had a history of graduating a high percentage of such ath-
letes. For example, a university would be ineligible for post-season
competition in a sport unless a high percentage of its student-ath-
letes in that particular sport met the continuing eligibility stan-
dards. As discussed below, a student-athlete who did not meet
continuing eligibility standards may be subject to sanctions as well.
Third, eligibility for athletics participation and academic stan-
dards to promote academic achievement should be separated. The
NCAA should convert provisions for academic standards into terms
of performance rather than as conditions precedent and subse-
quent to the performance of member universities. The NCAA
should promulgate narrow academic standards for athletic eligibil-
ity and enhanced standards for academic achievement. Member
colleges and universities governed by the principle of educational
primacy should promote the academic achievement of student-ath-
- 1 -Jl er -iIIII the valIJI th cuucauina op tunitY
provided to student-athletes in exchange for their athletic participa-
tion. A student-athlete would not lose athletic eligibility because of
academic performance unless the student failed to maintain good
academic standing at a university.
Fourth, universities and student-athletes should be provided
with incentives to maximize the value of an educational opportu-
nity. For example, NCAA rules prohibit universities from entering
into scholarship agreements for a term in excess of one year. The
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term for athletic scholarships should be structured similar to those
of most academic scholarships. That is, a student-athlete would be
guaranteed a scholarship for the full period of athletic eligibility on
the condition that the athlete annually meets the enhanced aca-
demic standards. 180 If a student-athlete has met these enhanced
standards, a university may renew the athletic scholarship; however,
the NCAA could go far beyond this example. The NCAA could re-
form the amateur system by permitting additional scholarship
amounts for meeting or exceeding the enhanced standards. Such
reforms provide student-athletes with incentives to take the risks
necessary for academic achievement.
Because these proposals are costly, universities may be reluc-
tant to embrace them. But NCAA rules could be structured to add
incentives for universities. For example, student-athletes who meet
or exceed the enhanced continuing eligibility standards could be
awarded another two year period of eligibility. Student-athletes
who meet or exceed the enhanced standards for four consecutive
years could be awarded a fifth year of athletic eligibility. Student-
athletes who graduate in five years could be given a grubstake sever-
ance scholarship.
Fifth, the responsibility for assuring educational value within
an institution should be placed on faculties. As matters now stand,
athletic departments governed by athletic primacy are the principal
institutional departments responsible for the value of the educa-
tional opportunity awarded to student-athletes. This responsibility
rightly belongs to the faculty, which is responsible for the curricula
and for determining the awarding of degrees. The faculty must be
given, and must accept, a larger role in the academic program of
student-athletes. The often-criticized "friendly faculty" are useful to
this recommendation, as they are usually the most interested and
most motivated in providing educational value and should not be
removed from the equation merely because of their affinity for
sports.181
It is also possible that the taboo against the establishment of
academic programs for student-athletes may also fall. This possibil-
ity would not result in the implementation of a program used by
180. As late as the early 1970s, universities extended athletic scholarships to
four-year terms. Under current NCAA rules, scholarships may not be offered for
more than one year, although they are renewable for up to five years. The change
in term may have occurred in response to Rev. Rul. 77-263, 1977-2 C.B. 47 (stating
that athletic scholarships are excludable if extended for one year or less).
181. See Allison, supra note 21, at 19.
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the University of Georgia in Kemp v. Ervin.18 2 The problems occur-
ring in that program resulted largely because of the incentive struc-
ture of the current regime. Both the university and student-athletes
were interested only in athletic eligibility. Programs designed by
faculty in an academic achievement regime would differ in imple-
mentation and outcome. Many universities offer academic support
programs for minority and other students in specific educational
programs. Those students who participate in such programs en-
hance their academic performance, which is the purpose behind
the programs. Such programs offered within the academic achieve-
ment framework suggested above ought to produce substantially
better results than the University of Georgia program.
This Article does not call directly for the abolition of amateur-
ism, although several suggestions contravene it. The solution pro-
posed does have tremendous implications for the future of
amateurism in intercollegiate athletics. Given the numerous com-
plications that would arise from the direct payment of compensa-
tion to student-athletes for their athletic skill or permitting them to
receive compensation from other sources, the prudent course is to
begin the reform of the compensation system with the educational
side. 1 83
V. CONCLUSION
Educational reforms in intercollegiate athletics have not gone
in the right direction because of the refusal or inability to recognize
the fundamental differences in missions of the NCAA and its mem-
ber institutions. The NCAA is an organization devoted to and gov-
erned by the principle of athletics primacy. Member institutions
are devoted to and governed by educational primacy. The current
regime fuses these disparate missions into one and has produced an
eligibility framework that inherently suppresses the value of the ed-
ucational opportunity paid to student-athletes in exchange for their
athletic participation. Separating the concept of acaueiiiic elgibil -
ity from athletic eligibility and transforming the former into one of
182. 651 F. Supp. 495, 499 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (stating that University had Divi-
sion of Development Studies for incoming freshmen who were not yet ready for
college level work). A participant was "exited" into regular college program upon
meeting requirements. See id. The coordinator was terminated after complaining
about the exiting of student-athletes who had not met the requirements. See id.
183. See WEISTART & LowELL, supra note 13, at 770-71 (noting specifically,
monetary gifts to students and economic inducements and commercial pursuits as
complications arising from student-athlete compensation).
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compensation through academic achievement will best maximize
the value of an educational opportunity.
This Article only advances the inquiry. It may well lead to de-
velopment of modifications to amateur eligibility as well. NCAA
member institutions compete against each other and professional
teams for the athletic services of student-athletes. Increasing the
compensation to athletes in educational currency may well lead to
the permissibility of payments to student-athletes for the use of
their names and images by universities, and perhaps, the signing of
contracts with professional sports teams without losing athletic eligi-
bility for intercollegiate athletics. It is time to adapt the dinosaur of
intercollegiate athletics to modern realities.
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